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	Attorneys for Defendants, Kari Lake, Jeffrey E. H	-
8	Kari Lake for Arizona, and Save Arizona Fund, I	nc.
9	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR	THE STATE OF ARIZONA
10	IN AND FOR THE COUN	TY OF MARICOPA
11	STEPHEN RICHER,	No. CV-2023-009417
12	Plaintiff,	
	V.	MOTION PURSUANT TO RULE 55(B)(2)(D) FOR A DEFAULT
13		JUDGMENT BY HEARING
14	KARI LAKE, JEFFREY E. HALPERIN, KARI LAKE FOR ARIZONA, and SAVE	
15	ARIZONA FUND, INC.,	JURY REQUESTED
13	Defendants.	
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	Defendants Kari Lake, Jeffrey E. Halperin	n, Kari Lake for Arizona, and Save Arizona
18	Fund, Inc. ("Defendants") move the Court to co	onduct a hearing pursuant to Arizona Rule
19	-f C'i1 D 1 55(1)(2)(D)i41 i 41 i(20) 1 4- :1-1-411:1:
20	of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2)(D) within thirty (30	days, to include the empaneting of a jury
	as needed to adjudicate factual disputes. Defe	ndants further request an order setting a
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	1	

scheduling hearing within five (5) court days¹ to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of this matter before the forthcoming primary and general elections.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Rule 55(b)(2)(D) states,

(D) Hearings and Referrals. The court may conduct hearings or make referrals—preserving any right to a jury trial—when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to: (i) conduct an accounting; (ii) determine the amount of damages; (iii) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or (iv) investigate any other matter.

Plaintiff Stephen Richer is "bring[ing] this case in his personal capacity." Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Richer has asserted five claims for defamation based on statements regarding Richer's official duties as Maricopa County Recorder, a job the public has allowed Richer to keep for now. Setting aside the curious contradiction of a personal lawsuit based on the performance of official duties, Richer's defamation claims are ultimately "dignitary torts," which are typically "not objectively quantifiable." *Havasupai Tribe of Havasupai Reservation v. Arizona Bd. of Regents*, 220 Ariz. 214, 227, ¶ 45 (App. 2008). Rule 55(b)(1)(A)—which allows for default judgment without a hearing—cannot apply to an unliquidated claim for reputational damages from defamation. *Id.* And although Rule 55(b)(2)(D) is couched in discretionary language, "the rule is that when the amount of damages is unliquidated it is incumbent upon the court to conduct the hearing to determine the amount of damages." *Mayhew v. McDougall*, 16 Ariz. App. 125, 130 (1971). "When damages are unliquidated, simply giving the plaintiff what he asks for may not attain that

¹ In his March 25, 2024 motion for sanctions, Plaintiff asked the Court to set a Rule 16 scheduling conference within five (5) days. Thus, Plaintiff and his attorneys presumably can accommodate a truncated timeline.

level of judicial discretion which will pass appellate muster." *Id.* Thus, as a matter of law, the Court must hold a hearing to ascertain Richer's damages before entry of judgment.

Additionally, to the extent Richer seeks special damages for his psychiatric, psychological, or other mental health treatment, Rule 9(g) states, "If an item of special damage is claimed, it must be specifically stated." Here, Richer alleges in Paragraph 170 of the Amended Complaint, that the "decline in his career prospects and constant calls for his resignation, prosecution, and even execution have taken a toll on Richer's physical and mental health and required him to spend time and money on additional medical treatment and medication." Yet the Amended Complaint fails to allege precisely how much Richer spent—if anything—for such treatment.² Given the absence of any specific allegation of total expenses incurred for Richer's psychiatric or psychological treatment, the Court can only make a damages determination on Richer's alleged medical treatment via Rule 55(b)(2)(D) hearing.³ This will include, at a minimum, requiring Richer to disclose his medical records to Defendants and the Court to that support Richer's damages claim.

The same can be said of what can only be described as "lost political profits." In paragraph 169 of the Amended Complaint, Richer alleges that Defendants "have damaged Richer's reputation by cutting him off from Republican networks and donors who once supported his career and future ambitions for elected office." Again, Richer fails to plead

² Although Richer claims to be proceeding in his "personal capacity," he presumably used his tax-payer funded health insurance to pay for any psychiatric, psychological, or other mental health treatment.

³ Defendants reserve the right to move the Court to order Richer to submit to a compulsory physical or mental examination under Rule 35(a), which states in relevant part, "A party may request that a physician or psychologist perform a physical or mental examination of another party, or a person who is in another party's custody or under its legal control, when that party or person's physical or mental condition is in controversy."

any cognizable dollar amount as to this item of special damages. At this point, Defendants presume that the allegations in the Amended Complaint were made in good faith and based on evidence in Richer's possession. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Thus, Richer can be expected to promptly disclose prior to a damages hearing precisely which donors and networks—to include any independent expenditure or "dark money" groups—abandoned Richer and just how much it cost him.

As noted above, Defendants request a jury to adjudicate any factual disputes. It is often said that defaulting admits the allegations in the operative complaint. This is a misnomer.

An entry of default serves as a judicial admission of all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. A party against whom default is entered, however, is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law. If a complaint does not include well-pleaded facts for a required showing, entry of default does not mean that required showing has been made.

Smith & Wesson Corp. v. The Wuster, 243 Ariz. 355, 358, ¶ 14 (App. 2017) (cleaned up). Here, Richer's conclusory, ipse dixit allegations that Defendants "caused" him harm are not the kind of "well-pled" allegations that are admitted upon default. See Fappani v. Bratton, 243 Ariz. 306, 311 (App. 2017) ("The complaint's allegation that Bratton 'caused' or 'demanded' the county attorney to prosecute Fappani is not based on well-pleaded facts. Fappani's complaint does not allege what Bratton did or said, when it was done, or to whom or how she communicated."). It is not enough, even at the default stage, for Richer rest on conclusory allegations that "Richer's injuries are traceable to Defendants' attacks on Richer." Am. Compl. ¶ 171. Again, Defendants presume for now that Richer's Amended Complaint was compliant with Rule 11. Thus, Richer—himself once an actively licensed

attorney in Arizona—knows he should be prepared to disclose competent evidence of causation promptly and in advance of a damages hearing. This includes evidence of precisely how Richer can establish the causal link between his categories of defamation ("Ballot Size Sabotage" and "Bogus Ballot Injection") and his claimed categories of damages.⁴

CONCLUSION

Arizona requires any lawsuit to make "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Richer's complaint spans over 40 pages and includes 171 numbered paragraphs before he alleges a single cause of action. Of those 171 paragraphs, only eight of them address causation and damages. See

Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 164-171. An accelerated damages hearing is appropriate to adjudicate

those matters which occupy less than five percent of the amended Complaint. The Court

should therefore grant the motion.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of March, 2024.

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⁴ Although Richer's Amended Complaint failed to allege a damages tier as required by Rule 8(b)(2), Richer has subsequently represented to the Court that this case should be assigned to Tier 3. Under Rule 26.2(e), Tier 3 cases are those with \$300,000 in damages, excluding "claims for punitive damages, interest, attorney's fees in the case to be tiered, and costs."

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