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GBAQGIUC 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 ----X VIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE, et al., 3 Plaintiffs 4 15 Civ. 7433 (RWS) V. GHISLAINE MAXWELL, et al., 5 Defendants 6 New York, N.Y. November 10, 2016 7 12:30 p.m. 8 Before: 9 HON. ROBERT W. SWEET 10 District Judge 11 **APPEARANCES** S. J. QUINNEY COLLEGE OF LAW 12 AT THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH Attorney for Plaintiff Giuffre PAUL G. CASSELL 13 14 BOIES SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP Attorney for Plaintiff Giuffre 15 MEREDITH L. SCHULTZ HADDON MORGAN & FOREMAN 16

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(In open court)

THE COURT: OK. Where we were was to consider the Churcher request with respect to the opinion. Is there any problem with the opinion or the redacted opinion?

MR. CASSELL: Not from the plaintiff, your Honor.

MR. PAGLIUCA: I am leaving that completely up to you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Have you given me an order or how do we do this?

MR. FEDER: Your Honor, Eric Feder for non-party
Sharon Churcher. We submitted on September 20, it's document
number 440, an agreed notice of filing the redacted opinion,
which attached a copy of the redacted opinion. So all we are
asking is that the Court sort of issue it as its own docket
entry that says opinion or memorandum and opinion, however the
Court wants to denominate it, because if we wanted to cite it
later, an exhibit would be hard for another court to swallow.

THE COURT: Your motion to publish the redacted opinion is granted, and I will file a docket entry to that effect.

MR. FEDER: Thanks, your Honor.

THE COURT: So that does that.

The testimony of Epstein.

MR. CASSELL: Your Honor, I think the matters we are getting into now are sealed matters, so I would move that the

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1 courtroom be closed at this point.

MR. WEINBERG: We agree, your Honor.

THE COURT: That's fine. You have to police the people who are present.

MR. CASSELL: I believe one attorney who is with Mr. Epstein, and there are several other persons here.

THE COURT: Well, obviously, Epstein is --

MR. CASSELL: Right, Epstein would be permitted, but there are several spectators here.

THE COURT: All right. Yes.

(The remainder of the hearing (pages 4-41) was sealed)

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(The following was held in a sealed courtroom)

MR. CASSELL: Your Honor, we would move to compel the testimony of Epstein. I know you've read the pleadings. I could just highlight a couple of small matters for you.

Paul Cassell for plaintiff, Virginia Giuffre. Our motion to compel breaks down into three very narrow pieces, as you know, from the pleadings. Let me highlight a couple of things that we think are foregone conclusions in the language of the case law.

Cell phone records. We've established, and, for example, in our reply brief, we have an exhibit that gives you not just general descriptions of phone records but very particular information about the phone records, even the ten digits that belong to the phone numbers. We've given you line one in Palm Beach County, line three in Palm Beach County. We've given you two phone numbers on Epstein's Gulfstream jet. We've given you two phone numbers on his 727.

The existence of telephone records for those specifically identified numbers is a foregone conclusion. And with regard to authenticating them, obviously the phone company can authenticate those. So we haven't heard any argument that provides any basis for his refusal to produce those phone records. And, remember, it isn't my job to convince you. It's their job to convince you that they have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege to not answering what are obviously very

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valid discovery requests.

Similar points could be made -- and I know you've seen the briefing on bank records. Again, we've given you not just the theory that there are bank records. We've given you the bank. We've given you account numbers. Remember, the Palm Beach Police Department executed a search warrant and actually got some of the bank records. So, the idea that he can now assert a Fifth Amendment privilege over bank records that are in the hands of the government strikes us as, to put it mildly, farfetched.

We've also asked for production of photographs. And, there again, in our exhibits filed along with the reply brief, we've actually given you photographs of the photographs we want. The existence of those photographs is a foregone conclusion. The cops went into Epstein's mansion executing a search warrant, saw photographs, and we simply want him to produce those photographs.

Finally, we think we've made a compelling case for those three particular areas of documents, but at a minimum, we're entitled to a privilege log. The defendant wants to litigate, or Mr. Epstein wants to litigate, this motion to compel in the abstract, but that's not the way it's done. The local court rules, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all cited in our brief, say you have to provide a privilege log if you're going to establish the privilege. Again, I'm a little

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frustrated because it's not my job to prove we're entitled to the documents. We served valid discovery requests. It's Epstein's attorney's job to show that he has a valid privilege. That's our first point.

As you know, our second point is we have 49 specifically identified questions that we think he has no basis for asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege to. Ten of those questions relate to Professor Dershowitz. And the reason we are obviously entitled, in our view, to answers to those questions is he was deposed in 2010, and this was a case that he initiated. So the defense attorney said, "Do you know Mr. Dershowitz?"

"Yeah, he's a friend of mine. He's my attorney." He has waived privilege over Dershowitz-related questions, at least in the ambit of that answer.

So, obviously, in our view, questions 23 through 31 are no-brainers because he's waived privilege over that, and I'm not sure they have ever really responded to that.

With regard to the other questions, some of these are pretty straightforward: Do you know the defendant in this case, Ms. Maxwell? I mean, you know, they lived together for ten years, and he's asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege over that?

Without going into the substance of any communication you've had, you've communicated with Maxwell in the last year.

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Again, that is not the kind of thing that can raise a realistic prospect of incrimination.

Here is another question. This is question 8 in our brief. In June 2008 in open court, you pled guilty to two Florida felonies. Well, that is on the record in Florida court. It's an open event with the government, by the way, who's prosecuting him, and he refused to even answer that question.

As you know, he refused to answer any question other than what's your name? So we have tried to be very selective. We've given you a list of 45 specific questions where we're entitled to the information.

Our third point, as you know, is this issue about Epstein being compelled to testify that he saw Maxwell, his girlfriend, before 2011 in foreign countries standing next to girls under the age of 18. And in response, he said, look, there's a lifetime statute of limitations for sexual abuse crimes, so I face a realistic risk of prosecution. The lifetime statute is an unusual statute, and that statute applies only to some of the most serious crimes in the federal criminal code: Sexual abuse of a child. But the only statute that was cited by Mr. Epstein was the traveler statute, which forbids traveling in foreign commerce to go someplace for nefarious purposes.

That is not covered by the lifetime statute. That's

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covered by the standard five-year statute of limitations in federal court. If you look at the elements of that crime, it involves simply traveling for sexual purposes. It's not the kind of crime that would warrant a lifetime statute of limitations. Again, that lifetime statute of limitation is reserved for very narrow offenses.

So we're entitled to force him -- again, we're not trying to force him to testify to everything under the sun. We want him to testify to events before 2010, so that's outside the five-year statute of limitations. And we're not even asking him to testify about events concerning him. We're asking him to say, well, when you were in Thailand, did you see Maxwell in the presence of underage girls. So, we've come up with three narrowly crafted requests, and we believe we're entitled to have Epstein compelled to answer the questions in those three areas.

Thank you, your Honor.

MR. PAGLIUCA: Your Honor, Jeff Pagliuca on behalf of Ms. Maxwell. I have also filed a motion to compel Mr. Epstein's testimony before your Honor.

I take a little bit of a different approach here,

Judge, because in my view there has been no showing by

Mr. Epstein that there is any reasonable possibility of

criminal prosecution. I've not seen one document, I've not

seen any letter from a police agency, I've not seen any target

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letter from the government, I've not seen any phone calls from anyone to Mr. Epstein. There has been no showing that there's any grand jury convened. There's no summons to Mr. Epstein to appear in any criminal matter. And all we have is this unsubstantiated assertion of "I may be prosecuted somewhere for something."

The law is very clear that it's Mr. Epstein's burden to establish some reasonable possibility of prosecution. That hasn't happened. And unless that happens, I believe Mr. Epstein should be forced to answer all questions put to him.

It's very difficult in my view to litigate this issue in that vacuum, your Honor, because I don't know what statute of limitations we're talking about because I don't know what crime is being proffered as what Mr. Epstein may be in jeopardy of facing.

So I think that that should be the Court's order, in that there's been a failure to demonstrate any reasonable possibility of prosecution. Mr. Epstein should answer all questions.

I do think it's a little difficult to piecemeal this out, your Honor, because when I listen to Mr. Cassell, he says, I want to narrowly ask questions about what did you see

Ms. Maxwell do. Well, I think the Court knows and Mr. Cassell knows, certainly, if there were a prosecution that were

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reasonable, all of those things would be used under a complicity theory or 404(b) theory. So if there were the establishment of a reasonable likelihood of prosecution, certainly all of those kinds of questions would fall within the Fifth Amendment, but my view is different in that there is no Fifth Amendment privilege that's been demonstrated as applicable here.

There's been discussion about Mr. Epstein somehow being in jeopardy in Florida, I guess. The evidence that I am aware of is that Mr. Epstein pled guilty as part of a joint state/federal investigation, and my view is that as a result of that guilty plea, along with the non-prosecution agreement, there is no reasonable possibility of prosecution. And that plea agreement seemed to encompass dozens, I believe, of alleged victims, and I am unaware of any alleged victims outside of the ambit of that prosecution. Certainly none has been proffered to the Court.

As cited in the papers, my view of the law is fairly clear that that operates as a bar to further prosecution, and, again, I do not see how Mr. Epstein is subject to any reasonable possibility of criminal prosecution. So that is my position on that issue, your Honor. Thank you.

MR. WEINBERG: Martin Weinberg on behalf of Mr. Epstein. Thank you, your Honor.

Let me start where the defendant left off.

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Mr. Epstein has a sufficient and reasonable fear of self-incrimination were he to be compelled by court order to answer the questions that were proposed to him. The fear comes in part from proceedings in the Southern District of Florida. He pled guilty to two very narrow state offenses that dealt with two women. That gives him no protection against a federal prosecution, no protection against any other allegation, no protection against the specific allegations that are front and center in the complaint in this case, where Ms. Giuffre says that Mr. Epstein with Ms. Maxwell committed a whole universe of criminal offenses against her in places, including Florida, but also in New Mexico, in New York, in the Virgin Islands in France and England and on planes. So there is no protection from the state plea for any of the allegations made by Ms. Giuffre in this case.

There is a risk that whatever limited protections

Mr. Epstein has as a result of his signing and performing under
a federal non-prosecution agreement he entered with the U.S.

Attorney's Office in the Southern District of Florida, that
protection is limited, and it's at risk. It's at risk largely
because of the efforts of Mr. Cassell. And I don't mean to be
critical. He is representing two other clients in this case.

It's a crime victims rights case brought before District Court
Marra starting in 2008. Still existing. Mr. Cassell has made
it very clear he testified in a deposition in a different case

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in Florida that the "ultimate aim of the action in Florida is to invalidate a non-prosecution agreement and allow criminal prosecution."

Our position, as we tried to articulate it for over seven years, and this is testimony from Mr. Cassell in a related case that he was a party to and gave a deposition in, and he goes on and says that "The action CVRA, the crime victims action, is ancillary to a contemplated criminal prosecution of Jeffrey Epstein for women who were resisting him in international sex trafficking.

So that's the goal of the plaintiff's counsel in this case while representing two other young women in a different case down in Florida. They want to nullify the limited protection Mr. Epstein has. It's protection in Florida, but again, Ms. Giuffre's allegations are that the offenses were committed by both the defendant and Mr. Epstein in four or five other locations, some foreign, some domestic.

Mr. Cassell -- even though we strongly believe that
Mr. Epstein who went to jail, served time, was on probation and
lived up to all his conditions of this non-prosecution
agreement, we strongly believe it would be unconstitutional to
invalidate it, but the truth is that Judge Marra in the
June 19, 2003 opinion, we cited it to your Honor, it's docket
entry 189 in that case, and it now has a West citation that I
believe is 950 F. Supp.2d, has said that he believes that the

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rescission remedy is a potential remedy. He has not dismissed Mr. Cassell's arguments. Instead, he has made it very clear in this opinion that he is strongly considering them, and if the violations, even though they were government violations of the CVRA, are proven, that he is going to consider rescinding Mr. Epstein's protections.

Again, those are limited protections to the Southern District of Florida, but even those are in peril as a result of the resourcefulness and arguments made by Mr. Cassell. So clearly, Mr. Epstein has a reasonable fear that if he is being asked to testify about the allegations made by Ms. Giuffre, whether it's directly or indirectly, by being asked, well, did Ms. Maxwell -- was she ever in the presence of underage women and you, the allegation is Ms. Maxwell helped Mr. Epstein have massages, erotic massages, sexual massages from underage women.

Any questions, whether they're in a document request, whether they're for testimony about Ms. Maxwell, about Ms. Giuffre are squarely within heartland of the Supreme Court's 1951 eight-to-one decision Hoffman v. U.S. I learned about that in law school back a long time ago. It is still the compelling precedent. It says any testimony that could be a link in the chain of evidence that has a reasonable risk to you, you are not compelled to testify about. It talks about, yes, we're going to give up having full testimony, whether it's in grand juries or civil trials because we are going to honor

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this historic privilege. I think Mr. Cassell in a very creative way has tried to ask the Court to essentially invalidate a privilege of somebody who is at risk.

In part, even in this case, Ms. Schultz's co-counsel, Ms. McCawley said when she was offering investigative records of another agency about an ongoing investigation, that's the word she used on April 21, 2016 at pages 18 and 19, and your Honor granted their right to provide your Honor in camera without disclosure whatever efforts were being made currently by Ms. Giuffre to motivate prosecutions or prosecutors against Ms. Maxwell, but the case against Ms. Maxwell is a case against Mr. Epstein. So he has a legitimate and principal concern that either the protections he has are too limited or they're going to be invalidated down in Florida. So that's the response to Ms. Maxwell's argument that he has no Fifth Amendment because he has no risk. He's at the epicenter of risk.

Directing myself more specifically to Professor

Cassell's arguments, the Fifth Amendment is an issue that
they've briefed, we've briefed, without agreeing that there is
no statute of limits; that it's the life of a child.

Ms. Giuffre is still a child. There is an interplay between
questions that ask Mr. Epstein, was Ms. Maxwell with an
underage woman. You know, were you with underage women and
questions like that, whether it's Thailand or France or
England, that if they relate to the travel, then certainly what

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occurred at the end of the travel is relevant to the travel. Likewise, the travel is relevant to what happened afterwards.

We have a statute now that makes it a crime, whether it's an adult or whether you're having illegal sex with somebody for money, whether it's with somebody underage, if you're having it in Thailand, if you're having it in France, and you're an American, you are now subject to federal criminal prosecution under the statute that we gave your Honor.

There are other statutes. There's man acts statutes.

There's travel statutes. There's a whole variety of statutes that Congress has put in to cause a legitimate risk that questions about Ms. Giuffre or Ms. Maxwell, whether the questions are fixed to a foreign location or a domestic location, could be the corroboration of Ms. Giuffre's otherwise uncorroborated allegations.

We have to look no farther than the Bill Cosby case. Nobody prosecuted him based on the allegation of one of the alleged victims; but when he gave a deposition, that was voluntary and made statements, that became the corroboration that led to his prosecution for events that occurred 20 or 25 years ago.

In terms of Professor Dershowitz, yes, Mr. Epstein did testify at a prior deposition about four or five years ago. At the time nobody had made any allegations connecting Professor Dershowitz to any of the allegations against Mr. Epstein except

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that he was his lawyer. In the meantime, Ms. Giuffre made allegations first in Florida that Professor Dershowitz was involved in some of these alleged offenses, and so that triggers a Fifth Amendment right. Mr. Epstein is not saying Professor Dershowitz did anything, but to testify about Professor Dershowitz, has he ever been to your home, again, has the potential to corroborate the allegations made by Mr. Cassell's client.

In terms of the waiver argument, the law is very clear that in contrast to an attorney-client privilege, if I was to disclose a privilege in one case, it's disclosed for all cases, but the law is very clear that you can testify in one proceeding and plead the Fifth Amendment in a separate and distinct proceeding. This was an issue that emerged in their reply brief. And if your Honor doesn't mind, I can either send in a supplement --

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. WEINBERG: -- which lists the cases. They're very clear. The Fifth Amendment is proceeding by proceeding.

MR. CASSELL: If we could just have permission to submit parallel responses.

MR. WEINBERG: In terms of the subpoena, the documents subpoenaed, Mr. Cassell focuses on three different categories of requests. One is cell records, and he says because we know that Mr. Epstein had phone records back in 2005 when he was the

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subject of the Florida search warrant, that, therefore, it's a foregone conclusion that he has records in 2016. And the specific request is not all telephone records. It's all telephone records associated with you, including cell records from 1999 to the present that show any communications with Ghislaine Maxwell. So he, Mr. Epstein, has to -- to answer this paragraph, it's not just dump cell records in a document response; it's go through cell records to determine from your state of mind whether any particular record matches this subpoena request, which is a record of a communication with Ms. Maxwell. Well, in this case given the allegations made by Ms. Giuffre about Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell, he's got a Fifth Amendment against even admitting that he knows Ms. Maxwell; that he's spoken to Ms. Maxwell. He has a Fifth Amendment against producing a record that he spoke to her during the time period of these allegations.

Second is that there is no foregone conclusion that a record that existed in 2005 is still controlled by Mr. Epstein in 2016. And we cited to the Second Circuit's August 1 opinion that addressed just this issue, and they said, "Whether it is a foregone conclusion that documents remained in Greenfield's control through the issuance of the summons in 2013 is the issue. Only if the retention of a record that could be shown to exist many years before, only if they can show that it's still retained on the date of the subpoena is it a foregone

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conclusion," which is an exception to the Fifth Amendment. And the Greenfield case says there needs to be proof that the record is still in the control and possession of Mr. Epstein, otherwise, his producing it is an admission. This is my phone. I still have the record. This month's record shows a call with Ms. Maxwell. It's akin to testimony. They could not ask Mr. Epstein under oath "Did you communicate with Ms. Maxwell during the date and time that Ms. Giuffre says you and her were committing illegal acts?" Just like they can't get it by testimony, they can't get it through a subpoena request that requires as its predicate an admission that this is a call with Ms. Maxwell.

The case cited even by the plaintiffs says, "The touchstone of whether an act of production is testimonial," which would be compelled testimony "is whether the government compels the individual to use the contents of his own mind to explicitly or implicitly communicate a statement of fact." Going through phone records, picking out a month and saying to the plaintiff, this is a record of a call I had with Ms. Maxwell is a communication, a selection by Mr. Epstein that the Fifth Amendment in decisions like Hubbell v. United States, discussing Greenfield, the Second Circuit recent opinion, cannot be the basis of a subpoena request.

The same thing with bank records. There is no subpoena request for bank records. What there is, is all

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documents relating to payments, you, Epstein, made to

Ms. Maxwell or any related entity. So, again, he has to go

through any financial record and select a record, use his state

of mind, select a record that relates to Ms. Maxwell. And by

producing it, it's akin to testifying this record is a record

between Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell. That's implied testimony.

That's an act of production. That's akin to testimony, and

that's an admission that this record is the record that is

sought by the subpoena. There is no request for bank records.

That would be an overbroad request. But they can't ask

Mr. Epstein to use his mind to select a document, the

production of which is the same as testifying to an event.

Photographs. They have photographs from 2005 seized in a search and seizure in Florida. Again, under Greenfield, the issue is not whether they existed in 2005. It's do you currently have photographs of nude women. And the act of producing a photograph of a nude would, one, corroborate allegations against Mr. Epstein that there were these pictures; and, two, require him to admit the existence of this evidence, which they don't know whether he still has or not. And that again goes back right to the heart of the Greenfield opinion.

Finally, the allegation about a privilege log. There is no privilege log that was required in a case that I provided your Honor, SEC v. Foster, because the issue here is not whether any specific document is privileged or not. It's

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whether the category of documents that are asked for in this subpoena are all privileged because they all ask Mr. Epstein to supply a document related to Virginia Giuffre, provide all documents providing relating to Ms. Maxwell, provide payments to Ms. Susue (ph), provide payments through credit cards that show Ms. Maxwell and Ms. Giuffre. In other words, all of the requests that would require him to use his mind, make a selection, and produce a record that when matched against the request would be incriminating testimony.

The cases are clear, including the *Hoffman* case from 1951, that you don't have to incriminate yourself, whether it's through a log or through testimony to raise the Fifth Amendment.

I'll end with a quote from Judge Learned Hand that was cited in a Yale Law Journal article called, "The Conjures Dilemma," which is the Fifth Amendment in civil cases where Judge Learned Hand says, "Obviously, a witness may not be compelled to do more than show that the answer is likely to be dangerous to him, else he will be forced to disclose those very facts which the privilege protects." To do a lie, to set out pictures of Virginia Giuffre 2001, the subpoena at paragraph 19 page 6 of the subpoena wants a log by date and by the content of a document that you're raising a privilege to. That has the same perils as the production of the document. It would be Mr. Epstein going through documents, listing them, naming them

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and saying that he still eleven years later or 12 years later has a document that matches the subpoena. The Fifth Amendment protects him. He should not, respectfully, be compelled to testify to produce documents.

MR. CASSELL: Let me just start at the outset by noting a point of agreement. We agree that Epstein with Maxwell traveled to Florida, New York, the Virgin Islands and elsewhere to sexually abuse children, and he remains at risk for criminal prosecution in some of those cases. So we start from the same premises that there are those crimes that are out there.

MR. PAGLIUCA: Your Honor, I object to this colloquy because this is improper. Ms. Maxwell denies any of what Mr. Cassell is saying, and this is just another attempt to inject this inflammatory rhetoric into the record. So I object.

MR. CASSELL: This is our complaint. I don't know that -- I am reiterating what's in our complaint and explaining how it applies to this case is inflammatory. I just want to point out that we agree with that premise. Starting from that premise, the issue that is in three narrow areas are we entitled to produce or force Epstein to produce some information. We hear from Mr. Weinberg that the 1951 Hoffman case recognizes a Fifth Amendment privilege, and of course it does. More recently -- and I don't know if this was after he

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went to law school -- Fisher case of 1976 recognized that even defendants who have committed serious crimes can be forced to produce information so long as the act of producing that information is not incriminating. And I believe Mr. Epstein has agreed that all of the documents do not have a Fifth Amendment privilege to which he's entitled to assert. The only question is whether the mere act of producing those documents is incriminating.

THE COURT: Just a second.

(Pause)

MR. CASSELL: Thank you, your Honor.

So I think we generally agree on the case law. The issue then is whether producing cell phone records -- let's take cell phone records. He says we would have to go through and pick out particular records, and that act of pulling out particular records is in and of itself incriminating.

We would ask our subpoena then to be construed to avoid constitutional objections. Just give us all his cell phone records. There is no picking and choosing at that point. The only reason that some of our requests were initially narrowed was to avoid a burdensomeness objection. If that's the a problem, we would ask leave to have our subpoena construed to request all the records so that isn't the problem, and we've tried to highlight in our brief areas where he is not being required to pick and choose.

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He talks about the situation of, well, will these records still remain in his control years later? Of course our subpoena extends through 2016, and obviously this month's cell phone records remain in his control, not to mention records that would extend back at least some period of time.

He cites the *Greenfield* case, which the Second Circuit decided this summer. *Greenfield* though involved a situation where there was a tax scam going on, I don't know, offshore movement of monies and so forth. And the issue there was, well, could the government authenticate the records from these tax shelters and places like that. Here, we're talking about AT&T and cell phone companies that are not fly-by-night operations, so *Greenfield* is an entirely different situation.

With regard to bank records, again, he's talking about picking and choosing. Simply construe our subpoena then or give us leave to amend our subpoena so that it includes all records. He doesn't have to pick and choose.

Photographs. He says that, well, who's to say whether he has them today. It would be incriminating to admit that I have those photographs today. But it has to be that the act of producing the photograph is incriminating. If we were asking him to produce child pornography, he would have a point because pulling out of your pocket a child pornography would in and of itself be incriminating. We are asking him to pull out though pictures of adult women, non-pornographic pictures of children

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under the age of 18 and give those to us. The act of producing those photographs -- and remember, we have in the record photographs of the photographs we are asking him to produce. So that can't be incriminating to the government. And, by the way, some of the information was information that was obtained when the state authorities were searching his house, so this isn't a situation where the government is unaware of the information. They have it.

At the very least, we're entitled to a privilege log on all of this. He cites the Foster case. The Foster case is not a privilege log case. If you look at our reply brief, I think we have seven or eight cases in very recent years where district courts have said, yes, produce a privilege log. We're entitled to a privilege log so we can know what the documents are.

That's our first point. Give us the documents or at the very least, give us a privilege log.

The second set of issues swirls around 49 specifically enumerated questions. I noted, once again, it's Mr. Weinberg's burden to show each and every one of those questions is incriminating. He hasn't done that in his pleadings, and he hasn't done that here this afternoon.

I gave you just a couple of illustrations. I thought Mr. Weinberg would at least try to respond to those illustrations. He did not. The only one he did respond to was

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Dershowitz.

Dershowitz has already been let out of the bag. The cat is out of the bag on that one. He says, well, don't worry, Judge, I'm going to give you legal authorities to show that on Monday, my client can stand up and tell the government all about Mr. Dershowitz, and then on Tuesday he can say, oh, no, I don't want to answer those same questions when propounded by Ms. Giuffre.

That's not the way a privilege log works. Once you waive privilege over the material, it's waived. He waived it in 2010. We're entitled to answers of the ten questions dealing with Dershowitz, and we're entitled to, what is it, 39 other answers to questions that are not reasonably incriminating.

The third area is the traveler statute. He said, look, if my client went to Thailand and then sexually abused girls with Maxwell, that's incriminating, so I'm entitled to assert the Fifth. There are a couple problems with that argument. Remember, crimes committed in foreign countries are not the proper subject of a Fifth Amendment privilege because the Fifth Amendment privilege only applies to American crimes. So now we have to get down to what American crime did Epstein commit or would Epstein be incriminating himself in if he said that in 2010 I saw Maxwell with an underage girl in Thailand.

There is only one statute that's been cited by

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Epstein, and that's the traveler statute, but the traveler statute does not involve sexual abuse. It involves traveling for illicit sexual conduct. The reason that is significant is, is there a lifetime statute of limitations for the traveler statute, or is it just a standard issue five-year statute of limitations? The standard issue five-year statute of limitations applies to all crimes presumptively, including, like Mr. Pagliuca was talking about conspiracy or something, that's a five-year statute of limitations. The only crimes that are outside the standard issue five-year statute of limitations are sexual abuse of children. The traveler statute does not involve sexual abuse of children, at least at an elemental level. You can commit a violation of the traveler statute if you just travel for certain prostitution purposes, and as a result -- and there was no case law that's been cited by Epstein -- only a five-year statute of limitations applies to the traveler crimes.

So even assuming arguendo that there is some incrimination about the traveler statute, it only exists for five years. I'm only going to ask Epstein questions from 2010 and earlier. Of course, the significant events in this case took place in '99 to 2001, making any possibility of prosecution even more remote.

For those very specific questions, we believe we're entitled to have Epstein compelled to answer.

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Thank you, your Honor.

MR. WEINBERG: Could I have one minute to respond, your Honor? I'm sorry, Jeff.

MR. PAGLIUCA: Thank you.

This is a whipsaw here for Ms. Maxwell. This is a perfect illustration of the whipsaw and the problem that we have.

Mr. Cassell stands up and says we agree with

Mr. Epstein's counsel that Maxwell sexually assaulted people
here, sexually assaulted people there with Mr. Epstein. Well,
none of that actually ever happened, your Honor. So they feel
free to say whatever they want to say because they know that
Mr. Epstein is going to say, well, I'm asserting the Fifth
Amendment privilege to whatever it is that you just said. So
they can make up whatever they want to make up and implicate
Ms. Maxwell, and Ms. Maxwell has no ability to get to the
source of the information to use it to exonerate herself in
this case. That's the whipsaw that's going on here, your
Honor.

There is another am problem that I want to -- well, the other problem here is this is a whipsaw that's created by the plaintiff and her counsel because the plaintiff and her counsel are trying to undo this non-prosecution agreement that then forms the basis of Mr. Epstein's Fifth Amendment privilege assertion. So to the extent that I can try to get to evidence

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that would be helpful to Ms. Maxwell, I'm prevented by the actions of the plaintiff and the actions of Mr. Epstein, and that's a problem in my view.

When Mr. Cassell talks about, well, these are these questions that I want to ask, well, all of those questions have follow-up questions from me, your Honor, which is, Ms. Maxwell didn't do this, and you weren't with Ms. Maxwell doing anything, and so we get into this, you know, descending into madness questioning with no good answer.

The other issue that I would like the Court to address is this reference to what was given to the Court in camera by the plaintiff that I've never seen, your Honor. This is some document that was apparently provided to the Court that I objected to, and I asked the Court to produce, that somehow implicates Mr. Epstein's Fifth Amendment privilege. So I would ask again, your Honor, that that document be produced to Ms. Maxwell because we've never seen it. So to the extent the Court is going to rely on that information, I don't believe that it's proper because we've never seen the document that was produced ex-parte in camera, and we've never had an opportunity to respond to it.

If indeed the basis of this Fifth Amendment assertion is the plaintiff's attempt to undo the non-prosecution agreement, there's an easy fix here. The plaintiff can agree not to undo the non-prosecution agreement. The plaintiff can

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agree that they will not be seeking rescission of Mr. Epstein's non-prosecution agreement as part of that action, which I might add, your Honor, that Jane Doe No. 3 was Ms. Giuffre who attempted to intervene in that action and still has an interest in the outcome of that action through her lawyers. So that can be agreed to by the plaintiff in this case which would then take us out from under this problem.

But I am caught in the middle of trying to get helpful evidence for my client, which I believe if Mr. Epstein was allowed to testify would support her position fully between Mr. Cassell and his argument and Mr. Epstein and his Fifth Amendment privilege.

THE COURT: Thank you all.

MR. WEINBERG: Can I briefly have a minute, Judge?

THE COURT: No. Thank you.

The next order of business is the reopening of the defendant's testimony.

MS. SCHULTZ: This is Meredith Schultz for Ms. Giuffre.

This Court has already ruled that it's appropriate to reopen a party deposition when that party produces documents after she's been deposed. Cases such as Wesley v. Muhammad support that ruling, and pursuant to your ruling, plaintiff is having her deposition taken again next week to answer questions about the documents she produced after her deposition.

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Here, defendant failed to produce two important documents until after her deposition and after the close of discovery. These documents are communications with Jeffrey Epstein, her co-conspirator and convicted pedophile, as well as with Ross Gow, her press agent who assisted her in issuing the defamation statement that is at issue in this case. As this Court will recall, defendant and her attorney, Phil Barden, wrongfully refused to produce her agent Ross Gow and forced Ms. Giuffre to spend tens of thousands of dollars to secure his deposition, finally taking place next week.

If Ms. Giuffre is not afforded the opportunity to ask defendant question about these documents, she will be prejudiced and defendant will be rewarded for her failure to make a timely production. Not only are these documents communications with key witnesses, your Honor, they're about a central topic to this case, defaming Ms. Giuffre through the media. These are not emails about the weather or anything like that. They're discussing further public statements about Ms. Giuffre. And importantly, your Honor, these communications took place after the original defamatory statement and one after the commencement of this litigation.

Defendant has argued that because Ms. Giuffre asked her questions about other communications she's had with these two individuals, it's unnecessary to ask about these documents. That argument is just unsupported by the facts, and defendant

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cites no case law to support that argument either. None of the questions posed to defendant at her previous deposition were about these two emails. They don't go to her state of mind when she was writing them, when she was communicating, and we don't have an opportunity to ask her what she was doing with those or use them to cross her prior testimony where she tries to walk away from any involvement in issuing the defamatory statement at issue here.

Reopening defendant's deposition is not only necessary for Ms. Giuffre to ask about these documents. Despite being directed by this Court to answer questions that she refused to answer in her first deposition, defendant again refused to answer questions in her second deposition in direct violation of this Court's order. For example, she refused to answer questions asking whether she could remember identifying the girls who were victims of Jeff Epstein during the time she was living and working with him and recruiting girls for her. For another example, she refused to answer questions about Johanna Sjoberg, who defendant recruited for sex with Epstein under the pretense of answering telephones for her. So, Ms. Giuffre has a motion pending concerning defendant's behavior in her second deposition in which she violated the Court's order by refusing to answer those questions.

Now, she's produced two more documents, important pieces of evidence, and accordingly this Court should reopen

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the deposition both to ask questions about the lately produced evidence, as well as the ones she refused to answer in violation of the order.

MR PAGLIUCA: Your Honor, let me start with the reference to plaintiff's conduct during her deposition, which is wholly different than the issue before the Court now.

At the direction of her lawyers, Ms. Giuffre refused to answer multiple relevant questions throughout the course of the deposition. The conduct in that deposition after we filed a motion to compel, her lawyers agreed that she needed to sit for a second deposition, and the only issue was whether it was going to be done by video conference or in person. Because of the egregious nature of the conduct, they knew that they had no chance at defeating that motion to compel. Here, your Honor, we are talking about two emails that were inadvertently not included in the production. We thought they had been produced, and when we went back through the documents, it appeared that they hadn't, so we produced them, as is our obligation under Rule 26.

The first email, your Honor, is an email from Mr. Gow to Mr. Barden and Ms. Maxwell that is forwarding an email from The New York Times and simply it says, you know, please advise how you wish to respond. That's it. That's the entirety of this email. There is no response from Ms. Maxwell. So what we're talking about here is an email that Mr. Gow forwarded

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saying please advise how you wish to respond. That's it.

This is virtually identical to other emails that are in the same time frame that were produced that Ms. Maxwell was -- they either had the opportunity to ask her these questions or in fact asked her these questions. So it is repetitive, and there is no evidentiary value to this particular email as opposed to the other emails that deal with exactly the same thing. That is, simply somebody saying what would you like me to do, if anything, about this thing that I got from somebody else. The appropriate person to ask about that email is Mr. Gow, and they're going to do that.

I also find it very curious, your Honor, that throughout the papers and argument there is some assertion, I think, that either Ms. Maxwell or her lawyers have done something wrong relative to Mr. Gow and then having to go take his deposition. I don't represent Mr. Gow. I don't control Mr. Gow, who is a citizen of the United Kingdom. I can't make him come here, and I can't make him sit for a deposition. If they want to go take his deposition, that's what they need to do and not complain about it or blame it on Ms. Maxwell, which is what they seem to be doing here.

The other email they're talking about, your Honor, is an April 22 email, which is, again, similar to other emails that were produced from the same time frame, and they asked or had the opportunity to ask questions about the exact same

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subject matter in Ms. Maxwell's deposition. So this is really,
I think, much ado about nothing here, your Honor, and this
motion should be denied.

MS. SCHULTZ: Your Honor, the emails are certainly about a very similar subject matter as emails she was already questioned about, and that is defaming Ms. Giuffre. The timing is different though. These emails occurred after the defamatory statement was released. The fact that she is still using the same press agent has evidentiary value because she didn't fire him. She didn't throw him out.

THE COURT: Ms. Maxwell will be deposed with respect to the emails. The deposition will be limited to two hours.

MS. SCHULTZ: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else on that subject? OK.

The last motion.

MS. SCHULTZ: Thank you, your Honor.

Defendant has turned a simple and straightforward discovery process into an unnecessary cat-and-mouse game. My next point is very --

THE COURT: Now, I really would appreciate -- look, I understand this case to a degree, at any rate. I understand that there are emotional values at stake, but, you know, we don't need the categorizations. Let's just deal with the issues.

MS. SCHULTZ: Sure. Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT: And we don't need to beat everybody up. 1 2 Let's just get to the point. 3 MS. SCHULTZ: This concerns electronically stored information, a very dry subject. Defendant has --4 THE COURT: Let me see if I understand it. You're 5 saying that there are email accounts that you believe existed 6 and as to which there has been no data produced. Is that it? 7 MS. SCHULTZ: That's part of it. Your Honor, let me 8 see if I can cut to the quick. Defendant hasn't denied that 9 10 she used email to communicate during the critical time period 2000 through 2002. She hasn't denied that. She has merely 11 12 said, oh, the email addresses you know about are not ones that I used. I think we have a lot of unanswered questions here 13 14 today, specifically what email accounts did she use those 15 years, what email did she use in 2000, 2001, and another thing, 16 your Honor, is new evidence --17 THE COURT: Wait. We're talking about a request for 18 documents, right? And have you not requested all emails during 19 the relevant period? 20 MS. SCHULTZ: Yes, your Honor, and this Court's order 21 directs the defendant to search from and produce from all email accounts and this is where I'm --22 23 THE COURT: Now, and you're telling me that you have 24 reason to believe that there are accounts as to which she has 25 not done this.

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MS. SCHULTZ: Yes, your Honor, for two reasons, and if I can get into that. The first reason is that, like I said, defendant hasn't denied that she used an email account during those years, but she hasn't disclosed what it was. She's merely said, oh, it's not the ones you know about. I don't think it's a very plausible argument for defendant to say I didn't use emails during those years. So we want to know what email she used and whether or not those accounts still exist or if they're archived somewhere. I think under her obligations under the federal rules and under this Court's order, she should be made to disclose what email she used in 2000, in 2001 in 2002. I think that's a very basic elemental part of her discovery.

The secondary problem, your Honor, is defendant has represented to this Court that the Mindspring.com email account that we discovered from the police reports, she said that that is a spam account that she uses to register at retail stores.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, to register?

MS. SCHULTZ: At retail stores. When you go shopping at retail location. She said she uses it for spam. Publicly available information that we've gathered shows that defendant used that account not just for spam. She used it for her Dropbox account, which is an online file sharing account where you can exchange files and photographs. She's used it for her Linked In account, which is a professional networking website

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that has inbox and messaging capabilities where messages from your professional contacts are routed to the email you sign up with, so in her case the Mindspring. We also found evidence that she used it for her Tumblr account. That is a social media website that also has inbox and messaging where over 22 percent of the content on this social website is pornographic and over 16 percent of the accounts created therein contain exclusively pornographic material.

So, here we have three examples that are not retail stores. These are user created, user driven and user controlled accounts, and social media accounts and file sharing accounts. It's not a spam account. Defendant's counsel has had plenty of time to ascertain how she used various email addresses and which ones she used, but we don't have that information.

Throughout the process there are still some basic and fundamental questions that have not been answered. What email account did she use in 1999, in 2000, and 2001? Are they still active? Are they archived somewhere? What communications does she have in her social media accounts? What documents and files does she have in Dropbox? The fact that we don't have answers to these questions 12 months into this litigation is troubling. Withholding information of these documents is contrary to our obligations, and it's contrary to this Court's order. If you will note, your Honor, nowhere in the response

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brief does it say, oh, I didn't have an email account during these years. It's a vague statement suggesting she has something that's unavailable to her on Epstein's private server.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. PAGLIUCA: Your Honor, so first so the record is clear Ms. Maxwell has never been asked the question please identify all of your email accounts for these years. There has never been an interrogatory to that request. There has never been a request in a deposition like that. And so this motion practice is now seemingly turning into some sort of grand jury query here.

We produced, your Honor, all of the responsive emails, and we spent many hours and thousands of dollars looking for these things. It is mind-boggling to me, frankly, that I'm arguing about this because we have searched every device that she has, it's been searched, and there are no responsive emails that we have not produced. I don't know what else to say other than we did it, and we don't have anything to produce to you. That's number one.

THE COURT: Well, what you are in effect saying to me, I think, is that you have answered the inquiry as to what accounts she has because you have searched the computers. So am I wrong?

MR. PAGLIUCA: Well, there's this argument that she

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must have had another account, and she has never said whether she does or she doesn't that I don't know how to address, quite frankly, and that relates back to the fact that nobody ever asked her did you have this account or did you have that account.

I can tell you what we did, and I think that answers the question, but what we did was, we collected the devices, we had them forensically searched. This is a long and involved process because, first of all, it was done once and that wasn't good enough. And then it was done again with a giant set of search terms which apparently wasn't good enough. And then it was done a third time with more expansive search terms. The third time resulted in the production of thousands of pages because there were words in there like "passport" and so on Ms. Maxwell's Terra Mar email, for example, every single email says "passport to the ocean" which is one of her catch phrases. I had to read all of those, thousands of these pages because the word passport was in there. So what I'm telling you is all of these things have been searched and everything that is responsive has been produced.

The Mindspring account, first of all, I take exception to what Ms. Schultz just said to the Court about somehow this is used pornographically, whatever she said. This is new information to me, which leads back to another point that is problematic on this motion. They've never conferred about any

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of this. If somebody said to me, oh, we found X, Y and Z, go look at it. I would go look at it and be concerned about it, but nobody has ever given me that information, and they tell it to you here without me having any opportunity to look into it and rebut it because I believe that I certainly will be able to because I believe what they're telling you is not true, period. THE COURT: OK. The motion to compel additional data is denied at this time. The parties will meet and confer. After that meet and confer, you can then advise me of any issues that remain. MS. SCHULTZ: Your Honor, can I serve an interrogatory asking for the email --THE COURT: I'm sorry? MS. SCHULTZ: I'd like to serve an interrogatory asking for what email addresses were used. MR PAGLIUCA: And I object, your Honor. MS. SCHULTZ: Discovery is closed. So while we're in front of you, I'm asking for permission to serve that because I don't know how to get --THE COURT: Well, that where are we? Actually, correct me if I'm wrong, fact discovery is closed? MR. PAGLIUCA: Yes, for months now. THE COURT: And if we open it up for an interrogatory here, an interrogatory there -- I think we are stuck with

whatever the record is at the moment. So you can meet and

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1	confer on this Mindsprung or spring or whatever and see where
2	you come out. And I would be pleased to hear you again if it
3	is necessary.
4	MR. PAGLIUCA: Happy to do that, your Honor.
5	MS. SCHULTZ: Thank you, your Honor.
6	MR. WEINBERG: Judge, since this matter is under seal,
7	may I send the supplemental letter regarding the Fifth
8	Amendment waiver issue?
9	THE COURT: Sure, of course.
10	MR. CASSELL: And I
11	THE COURT: Yes, you may respond.
12	(Adjourned)
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